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ARTICLE 
PNR in 2011: Recalling Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in 
PNR Information Management 
Valentin M. Pfisterer* 
ABSTRACT 
In Fall 2011, U.S. and EU negotiators agreed on new parameters for the collection, processing, use, 
storage and crossborder transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. 2011 also marks the tenth 
anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the 
Pentagon in Washington D.C., which provides the historic reason for the cooperation in this area. These two 
events thus provide a timely basis and background against which to review the ten year history of the 
cooperation between the U.S. and the EU in PNR information management. 
This article maps the evolution of collaboration between the U.S. and the EU with respect to the 
PNR program by presenting the major dimensions involved. Moreover, it provides a comprehensive 
framework with a particular focus on the constant struggle for a consistent EU policy as well as the 
creation of the U.S.-EU Agreements in 2004 and 2007. It furthermore sketches major legal and political 
developments that have most likely had a significant impact on the negotiations and are, as a 
consequence, reflected in the concrete design of the new PNR Agreement. All this leads the author to 
the conclusion that—as thoroughly as it may have been designed and as complete as it may seem—the 
new PNR Agreement will not be the end of the transatlantic PNR saga, but rather the beginning of 
another intriguing chapter. 
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Bogdandy); Doctoral Candidate at the Law Faculty of the University of Leipzig (Prof. Markus Kotzur, LL.M. (Duke 
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I. INTRODUCTION: TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND A NEW AGREEMENT WITHIN 
REACH 
The cooperation between the United States and the European Union in the area of counterterrorism has 
many faces—political, institutional, economic, social, technological, and legal, among others. Its legal 
dimension alone is highly complex as it covers a vast array of issues such as the use of force in armed 
conflicts (especially Afghanistan) and the cooperative management of information for law enforcement 
purposes. The cooperation in this latter area further comprises at least two loosely connected storylines, each 
one reflected in an acronym: SWIFT and PNR. 
The former stands for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a Belgium-
based financial institution, and relates to the transatlantic transfer of financial messaging data for law 
enforcement purposes. The most visible elements of this storyline are the two corresponding 
agreements between the U.S. and the EU of 2009 and 2010.1 The latter stands for Passenger Name 
Record data, specific files on every passenger and journey created by air carriers, and relates to the 
transatlantic transfer of information contained in these files for law enforcement purposes.2 This 
storyline has equally gained visibility in the form of two corresponding agreements between the U.S. 
and the EU in 2004 and 2007.3 
Although the 2007 PNR Agreement is envisaged to expire in a few years, the competent U.S. 
authorities and the European Commission (“Commission”), decided to renegotiate the Agreement.4 Only 
recently, these negotiations have come to an end, and a new PNR Agreement will be produced in the near 
future.5 This is, in itself, reason enough to bring transatlantic cooperation in the sharing of PNR information 
back to the academic and political agenda. Another reason is that the tenth anniversary of the historical 
reason that underlies this particular area of cooperation was to be commemorated only a short while ago. 
Against this backdrop, and although certainly developed from a European perspective, the present article 
tries to recall the cooperation between the U.S. and the EU in the context of PNR information sharing. 
                                                 
1 Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial 
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 
O.J. (L 8) 11 [hereinafter 2009 SWIFT Agreement]; Agreement between the European Union and the United States of 
America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 2010 O.J. (L 195) 5 [hereinafter 2010 SWIFT Agreement]. See also 
Valentin Pfisterer, The Second SWIFT Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America – An 
Overview, 11 GER. L. J. 1173 (2010). Only recently, a first report on the implementation of the 2010 SWIFT Agreement was 
released by the European Commission, Report on the joint review of the implementation of the Agreement between the 
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging data from the 
European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, Mar. 16 2011, available 
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/10_tftpjointreview2011/10_tftpjointreview 
2011en.pdf. 
2 For more general information on PNR data, see Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, (July 13, 2007), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/294& format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN. 
3 Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger 
Name Record data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security 2004 O.J. (L 183) 84 [hereinafter 
2004 PNR Agreement]; Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security 2007 
O.J. (L 204) 18 [hereinafter 2007 PNR Agreement]. 
4 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 3, at ¶ 9 (“This Agreement and any obligations there under will expire and cease to have 
effect seven years after the date of signature unless the parties mutually agree to replace it.”). 
5 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, New EU-US agreement on PNR improves data protection and fights crime and terrorism 
(Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1368&format=HTML 
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=de; as to the media coverage, see Nikolas Busse, Neues Abkommenzu Fluggastdaten, 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE [F.A.Z.], Nov. 9, 2011, available at http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/eu-einigt-sich-mit-
amerika-neues-abkommen-zu-fluggastdaten-11523193.html (Ger.). 
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To this end, it will first map the scene with a particular focus on the substantive legal dimension (II). 
Second, it will provide a comprehensive retrospect with an emphasis on the two PNR Agreements (III). 
Third, it will address some selected recent developments that are likely to have determined the negotiations 
of the new PNR Agreement (IV). Finally, it will conclude and dare to make an outlook to the future (V). 
II. MAPPING THE SCENE 
Transatlantic cooperation in the context of PNR information sharing basically translates to the 
collection, processing, use, storage, and—most paradigmatically—crossborder transfer of PNR data. In the 
face of the complexity of this enterprise, the following chapter will first outline the aspects that were 
considered of major importance by the Commission as reflected in the corresponding Communications (A). 
After that, it will sketch its major controversy as far as substantial law is concerned (B). 
A. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS 
When it comes to the major concerns that most likely framed the political debate on the transatlantic 
cooperation on PNR, two Communications released by the Commission can give some guidance.6 To a 
certain degree, they shed light on the considerations that determined and still determine the decision-making 
of the Commission in this context. 
In December 2003, the Commission transmitted a communication on the transfer of air passenger name 
record data (“2003 PNR Communication”) to the Council of the European Union (“Council”) and the 
European Parliament (“Parliament”).7 In this document, it identified seven overarching aspects that were to 
be given due weight in the PNR context.8 These aspects were: 
[T]he fight against terrorism and international crime, the right to privacy and the protection of 
fundamental civil rights, the need for airlines to be able to comply with diverse legal requirements 
at an acceptable cost, the broader EU-U.S. relationship, the security and convenience of air 
travellers, border security concerns, [and] the truly international, indeed world-wide, scope of 
these issues.9 
In its communication on the global approach to transfers of passenger name record data to third 
countries from September 2010 (“2010 PNR Communication”),10 the Commission basically confirmed 
the validity of these concerns.11 It listed the five reasons underlying it revised its global approach as 
follows: the “[f]ight against terrorism and serious transnational crime,”12 the effort to “[e]nsure the 
protection of personal data and privacy,”13 the “[n]eed to provide legal certainty and streamline the 
obligations on air carriers,”14 the attempt to “[e]stablish general conditions aimed at ensuring coherence 
and further developing an international approach,”15 and the “[c]ontribution in increasing passenger 
                                                 
6 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, 
Transfer of Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach, COM (2003) 826 final [hereinafter Comm. of 
Dec. 16, 2003]; European Commission, Communication on the global approach to transfers of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data to third countries, COM (2010) 492 final [hereinafter Comm. of Sept. 21, 2010]. 
7 Comm. of Dec. 16, 2003, supra note 6. 
8 Id. at 4. 
9 Id. 
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convenience.”16 In addition, it named three general considerations as relevant: the “[s]hared security 
interest,” the “[p]rotection of personal data,” and “[e]xternal relations.”17 
These aspects already convey a certain impression of the complexity of the entire issue. It can be 
assumed, however, that there are additional considerations that played and still play a significant role 
although they may not be meant for the public. Among those most likely is the relation—in other words, the 
distribution of power—between the different EU institutions as well as between the EU and its Member 
States. 
B. SECURITY VS. PRIVACY 
As pointed out above, the transatlantic cooperation in the PNR context concretely refers to the 
collection, processing, use, storage, and transatlantic transfer of PNR data. The purpose of these actions is to 
fight terrorism and serious crime.18 
The fight against terrorism and serious crime is indeed one of the major goals of the EU. The EU 
Treaty (“TEU”) states that the EU: 
[S]hall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in 
which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of 
crime.19 
The same article transfers that goal to the “relations [of the EU] with the wider world” and urges it to 
“uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens.”20 
The fight against terrorism and serious crime, however, does not take place in a legal vacuum. The EU 
is attached to “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and of the rule of law.”21 This means that the EU “recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“ChFREU”).22 Furthermore, “[f]undamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”) and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.”23 Among those fundamental rights is the right to 
respect for private life24 as well as the right to protection of personal data.25 In its often-cited judgment in the 
Niemietz case of 1992, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held that article 8 of the ECHR: 
                                                 
16 Id. at 6–7. 
17 Id. at 7. 
18 2007 PNR Agreement, supra note 3, Preamble, ¶ 1 (“Desiring to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational crime 
effectively as a means of protecting their respective democratic societies and common values.”). 
19 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union art. 3, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 17 [hereinafter TEU]. 
20 Id. The corresponding policies are reflected most explicitly in European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: 
European Security Strategy, (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf; and 
European Commission, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM 
(2010) 673 final (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/archive/ 
internal_security_strategy_in_ action_en.pdf [hereinafter EUISSA 2010]. 
21 TEU, supra note 19, at Preamble. 
22 Id. at art. 6. 
23 Id. 
24 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 7, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 389 [hereinafter ChFREU] (“[e]veryone has 
the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter ECHR] (“[e]veryone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
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[D]oes not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of 
‘private life.’ However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which 
the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the 
outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to a 
certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.26 
Despite the uncertainty as to the concrete scope of the provision, the ECtHR found it to be its essential 
object and purpose “to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities.”27 In light 
of and consistent with this broad perception of privacy, the ECtHR turned the collection, processing, use and 
storage of personal data into a question of fundamental rights in general and the right to respect for private life 
in particular.28 The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), in turn, appropriated the corresponding jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR, including its concept of privacy.29 Although the ChFREU, other than the ECHR, contains a 
specific right to the protection of personal data in Article 8, the ECJ keeps highlighting the close connection 
between the right to protection of personal data and the right to respect for private life.30 
Against this backdrop, transatlantic cooperation in the sharing of PNR information reflects the classical 
dichotomy between security and privacy.31 Security has to be achieved by the vast collection of personal 
data without suspicion by public authorities for law enforcement purposes. Privacy is a sphere that is 
particularly sensitive to intrusion by public authorities and, therefore, to be protected by the “most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”32—the right to privacy.33 
III. LOOKING BACK 
This underlying controversy has surfaced repeatedly in the history of the transatlantic cooperation in 
the PNR context. Finding the right balance between security and privacy has often turned out to be a 
difficult challenge – not only as regards the negotiation and adoption of the two PNR Agreements between 
the U.S. and the EU (C), but also as regards the coordination between the EU institutions (B). If the U.S. 
authorities that are the major advocates for security, this is once more due to the legacy of 9/11 (A). 
                                                                                                                                                                         
25 See ChFREU, supra note 24, at art. 8 (“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. Such 
data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data, which has been collected concerning him or her, 
and the right to have it rectified. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”). 
26 Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 29 (1992). 
27 See Niemietz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 31. See also, Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 31 (1979). 
28 See Leander v. Sweden, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 433 (1987); Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23223/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 (1999); 
Amann v. Switzerland, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 843 (2000); Rotaru v. Romania, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 449 (2000); Marper v. United 
Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581 (2008). 
29 See, e.g., Joined Cases C–465/00, C–138/01, & C–139/01, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and others, 2003 
E.C.R. I–4989, ¶¶ 73–75; Joined Cases C–92/09 & C–93/09, Volker und Marcus Schecke GbR & Hartmut Eifert v. Land 
Hessen & Bundesanstalt fur Landwirtschaft und Ernahrung, 2010 E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ 59. 
30 Schecke, 2010 E.C.R. at ¶ 47 (“That fundamental right is closely connected with the right to respect of private life expressed 
in Article 7 of the Charter.”). 
31 Arthur Rizer, Dog Fight: Did the International Battle over Airline Passenger Name Records Enable the Christmas-Day 
Bomber?, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 79–83 (2010); Alenka Kuhelj, The Twilight Zone of Privacy for Passengers of 
International Flights between the EU & USA, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 383, 388–393 (2010). 
32 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
33 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). For a comprehensive study of the 
most important conceptions of privacy as regards U.S. Constitutional law and U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Daniel 
Solove, Conceptionalizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002). For a transatlantic comparison, see James Whitman, Two 
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004). 
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A. 9/11 AS THE HISTORICAL REASON 
The PNR saga began in winter 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 
New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., on September 11, 2001.34 As a reaction to those 
terrorist attacks, the U.S. Government engaged in counter-terrorism activities of all kinds in the following 
months and years.35 The U.S. Congress, in particular, enacted a series of laws aimed at the fight against 
terrorism.36 In this context, air carriers operating flights to, from, or through the U.S. were obliged to grant 
the competent U.S. authorities access to PNR data contained in their reservation and departure control 
systems.37 The goal of this legislation was “[t]o improve aviation security” and “[t]o enhance the border 
security of the United States.”38 The Commission soon became aware of the potential clash of the legislation 
adopted by the U.S. Congress and the corresponding obligations of the air carriers on the one hand and data 
protection principles as laid down in EU law on the other.39 As a consequence, it engaged in negotiations 
with the U.S. authorities to solve these problems and establish a sound legal framework for the respective 
obligations of the air carriers. 
However, apart from the transatlantic negotiations, controversies within the institutional structure of 
the EU turned the corresponding decision-making into a difficult enterprise. 
B. THE CONSTANT STRUGGLE FOR A CONSISTENT EU POLICY 
The struggle for a consistent EU policy is again being reflected through the two PNR Communications 
of the Commission and their creation and evolution. 
1. The 2003 PNR Communication 
The EU Parliament certainly welcomed the fact that a dialogue was opened between the U.S. and the 
EU on the issue. Apparently, however, it did not share the reserved approach applied by the Commission. As 
a consequence, it adopted two corresponding resolutions in March and October 2003.40 
In the first one, it “[c]alls on the Commission to secure the suspension of the effects of the measures 
taken by the U.S. authorities pending the adoption of a decision regarding the compatibility of those 
measures with Community law” and “reserves the right to examine the action taken before the next EU-U.S. 
                                                 
34 As to the historical dimension, see also Arthur Rizer, supra note 21, 83–91; Marjorie Yano, Come Fly the (Unfriendly?) Skies: 
Negotiating Passenger Name Record Agreements between the United States and the European Union, 5 J. L. & POL’Y FOR 
INFO. SOC’Y 479, 485-501 (2010). 
35 The most controversial aspects of this activity have most likely been the U.S. led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 
establishment of the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba). 
36 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, of 
2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107–56 (explaining that the Act intends “[t]o deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States 
and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”); see David Abraham, The 
Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 
256-62 (2008). 
37 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–71 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 49 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter ATSA]; see also Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSV) of 2002, Pub. L. 
107-73 codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter EBSV]. 
38 ATSA, supra note 37, at preamble; EBSV, supra note 37, at Preamble. 
39 Parliament and Council, Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data on 
the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. To the fundamental rights 
dimension of data protection, as laid in section II.B.2., relevant secondary legislation is to be added, first and foremost. As to 
the dilemma faced by the air carriers concerned, see Megan Roos, Safe on the Ground, Exposed in the Sky: The Battle Between 
the United States and the European Union over Passenger Name Information, 14 Transnat’l & Contemp. Probs. 1137 (2005). 
40 See European Parliament Resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights, 2003 O.J. (C 
61) [hereinafter European Resolution of Mar. 13, 2003]; see also European Parliament Resolution on transfer of personal data 
by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights: state of negotiations with the USA, 2003 O.J. (C 81) [hereinafter European 
Parliament Resolution of Oct. 9, 2003]. 
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summit.”41 In the second, it calls on the Commission, once again, to take action and “urges that a direct 
contact group be established between Members of the European Parliament and Members of the U.S. 
Congress, in order to exchange information and discuss the strategy of ongoing and upcoming issues.”42 
Against this as the backdrop, the Commission released the 2003 PNR Communication.43 Its goal 
was to set out the criteria that the EU considered decisive for its future actions in the context of the 
transfer of PNR data.44 In this document, the Commission first sketched the factual background of the 
Communication, then presented the main components of its future approach and finally laid out its 
elements in more detail.45 
As to the main components, the document revealed the political aspects that were to be given due 
consideration in the issue at hand (II.A.).46 Thus, it prioritized the following elements as the the five main 
components of the EU global approach: (1) “[a] legal framework for existing PNR transfers to the U.S.;”47 
(2) the “[c]omplete, accurate and timely information for passengers;”48 (3) the replacement of the “‘pull’ 
(direct access by US authorities to airlines' databases) with a ‘push’ method of transfer, combined with 
appropriate filters;”49 (4) the “development of an EU position on the use of travellers' data, including 
PNR, for aviation and border security;”50 and (5) the “creation of a multilateral framework for PNR Data 
Transfer within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (“ICAO”).”51 For the present article, the 
legal framework for the PNR transfer to the U.S. is of particular importance. In this context, the 
Commission claimed to have already “substantially improved” the applicable arrangements on data 
protection by means of its negotiations with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“BCBP”).52 
The safeguards—laid out in written Undertakings transmitted by the BCBP—now contained quantitative 
limits to the amount of data to be transferred, mandatory deletion requirements, a more precise and 
narrower tailoring of the transfer requests, a limitation of the maximum retention period, the establishment 
of a responsible Chief Privacy Officer (“CPO”) at the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) as well 
as an annual joint review of these safeguards.53 The adequacy of the level of data protection provided for 
by these undertakings, however, was questioned by the corresponding opinion of the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party (“DPWP”) from June 2003.54 For the future, the Commission would seek a 
more solid legal arrangement. It was to include a formal Commission Decision pursuant to art. 25(6) of 
the Data Protection Directive that confirms the adequacy of the level of data protection guaranteed by U.S. 
authorities and allows for the onward transfer of personal data as well as an international agreement.55 
In retrospect, particularly in view of the 2010 PNR Communication (2), the 2003 Communication can 
be said to have identified the major issues and laid ground for further development. However, in some 
                                                 
41 European Parliament Resolution of Mar. 13, 2003, supra note 40, at ¶¶ 5–6. 
42 European Parliament Resolution of Oct. 9, 2003, supra note 40, at ¶ 4. 
43 Comm. of Dec. 16, 2003, supra note 6. 
44 Id. at 4. 
45 Id. at 3–10. 
46 Id. at 4. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 5. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.; see also Irfan Tukdi, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Passenger Name Record Conflict, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 587, 611–13, 
620–21 (2009) (describing a multilateral framework as a potential solution to the underlying controversies). 
52 Comm. of Dec. 16, 2003, supra note 6, at 5. 
53 Id. at 6–7. 
54 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party [hereinafter DPWP], Opinion 4/2003 on the Level of Protection ensured in the US for the 
Transfer of Passengers' Data (June 13, 2003), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jun/wp78_en.pdf; see also DPWP, 
Opinion 2/2004 on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Contained in the PNR of Air Passengers to Be Transferred to the 
United States' Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (US CBP) (January 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/feb/WG29-PNR-US.pdf. 
55 Comm. of Dec. 16, 2003, supra note 6, at 4. 
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aspects it remains in the abstract and is certainly not suitable to give solid guidance as to specific problems 
potentially arising in the issue. 
2. The 2010 PNR Communication 
Seven years after the release of the 2003 PNR Communication, the transatlantic PNR landscape had 
significantly changed (C). On the EU side, however, one well-known pattern remained unchanged: The 
Parliament was still not convinced by the approach applied by the Commission. Hence, in a Resolution of 
May 5, 2010, the Parliament called for: 
[A] coherent approach on the use of PNR data for law enforcement and security purposes, 
establishing a single set of principles to serve as a basis for agreements with third countries; 
invites the Commission to present, no later than mid-July 2010, a proposal for such a single 
model and a draft mandate for negotiations with third countries.56 
The Commission indeed responded on September 21, 2010, and released the above-mentioned 2010 
PNR Communication.57 Seven years after the release of the 2003 PNR Communication, the Commission 
considered itself confronted with “new trends and challenges” as regards international PNR transfers. “The 
number of countries in the world developing PNR systems will most likely increase in the coming years. 
Furthermore, the EU gained important insight into the structure and value of PNR systems through its 
experience with carrying out joint reviews of the agreements with the U.S. and Canada.”58 Because the 
measures envisaged in the 2003 PNR Communication had either already been implemented or were actually 
being implemented, the key objective of the 2010 Communication was to reconsider its strategy on the issue 
and to establish “a set of general criteria which should form the basis of future negotiations on PNR 
agreements with third countries.”59 In the document, the Commission first addressed the factual 
developments of the recent years.60 Second, it commented on international trends in the area.61 Third, it 
presented a revised EU approach to the matter and finally provided for a long-term perspective.62 
Especially with regard to the revised global approach on PNR for the EU, the document sets out in 
depth the various safeguards to be incorporated into future agreements. Among those are a strict purpose 
limitation (with respect to the use and the scope of the data), particular restrictions with regard to sensitive 
data, special requirements as to data security, provisions on oversight and accountability, the guarantee of a 
right to access, rectification, deletion and redress, limited retention periods as well as a restriction of 
potential onward transfers (to other government and other countries).63 With respect to the long-term 
perspective, the Commission repeats its general dedication to a multilateral solution of the entire issue.64 
C. TRANSATLANTIC PNR AGREEMENTS 
The EU approach was originally directed towards a multilateral solution which was considered “the 
only practical way to address international air travel issues.”65 The approach actually put into practice, 
                                                 
56 European Parliament Resolution on the launch of negotiations for Passenger Name Record agreements with the United States, 
Australia, and Canada, 2010 O.J. (C 81) 70, ¶ 7. 
57 Comm. of Sept. 9, 2010, supra note 6. 





63 Comm. of Sept. 21, 2010, supra note 6, at 6–10. Regarding the safeguards in the area of data protection, there is a broad 
overlap between the mechanisms envisaged by the Communication (and most likely contained in the new PNR Agreement) 
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64 Comm. of Sept. 21, 2010, supra note 6 at 10. 
65 Id. at 4. See also Id. at 10. 
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however, was bilateral and on a case-by-case basis.66 At present, the EU has three international PNR 
agreements in place: with Canada (2005), the U.S. (2007) and Australia (2008).67 Whereas the struggle of 
the EU for a consistent policy on PNR information sharing, looked at in isolation, already reflects the 
difficulty of the entire issue, the effort to establish a legally sound international agreement between the U.S. 
and the EU turned out to be even more challenging.68 
1. Toward the 2004 PNR Agreement 
As alluded to in the 2003 PNR Communication, the Commission led the negotiations with the U.S. 
authorities with the goal of entering into an international agreement with the U.S. In the course of these talks, it 
apparently received sufficient commitment from its counterpart that—in its judgement—matched the 
requirements of an “adequate level of protection.”69 Consequently, on May 14, 2004, it released a formal 
Decision pursuant to Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive that confirmed the adequacy of the level of 
protection guaranteed by U.S. authorities and allowed for the onward transfer of personal data.70 As far as the 
involvement of the Parliament is concerned, a draft version of the Decision had been transmitted to it on March 
1, 2004. In reaction, the Parliament adopted a corresponding Resolution on March 31, 2004, that criticized the 
envisaged Decision as well as the envisaged agreement in many aspects.71 Consequently, it called on the 
Commission “to withdraw the draft decision” and “to submit to Parliament a new adequacy-finding decision and 
to ask the Council for a mandate for a strong new international agreement in compliance with the principles 
outlined in this resolution.”72 In the meantime, the Parliament stated that it “reserves the right to appeal to the 
Court of Justice should the draft decision be adopted by the Commission” and “[r]eserves the right to bring an 
action before the Court of Justice in order to seek verification of the legality of the projected international 
agreement and, in particular, the compatibility thereof with the protection of a fundamental right.”73 As neither 
the Commission nor the Council shared the perspective of the Parliament, the Council adopted the decision 
required by Article 300(2) of the then-valid EC Treaty.74 Hence, it allowed the Agreement between the European 
Community and the U.S. on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (2004 PNR Agreement) to enter into force.75 
Beforehand, a proposal for the Council Decision had also been forwarded to the Parliament on March 17, 2004. 
The Parliament, however, had missed the opportunity to make a corresponding statement.76 
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68 As to the transatlantic dimension of the PNR saga, see Richard Rasmussen, Suspicion of Terrorism? The Dispute between the 
United States and European Union over Passenger Name Record Data Transfers, 26 WIS. INT. L. J. 551 (2008); Rizer, supra 
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Passengers Transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11. 
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United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of 
Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83. 
75 2004 PNR Agreement, supra note 3. 
76 As to the inter-institutional difficulties in this respect, see Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Joined Cases C-317/04 &C-
318/04, Parliament v. Council and Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. I–4721 ¶¶ 1–16, 33–49. 
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2. The 2004 PNR Agreement 
The 2004 PNR Agreement consisted of a preamble and an operative part consisting of eight 
paragraphs. Pursuant to the most important provision: 
CBP may electronically access the PNR data from air carriers’ reservation/departure control systems 
(“reservation systems”) located within the territory of the Member States of the European Community 
strictly in accordance with the Decision and for so long as the Decision is applicable and only until 
there is a satisfactory system in place allowing for transmission of such data by the air carriers.77 
Hence, it basically permitted the CBP to access the relevant data by way of a “pull”mechanism and 
without major material or procedural restraints. The safeguard mechanisms included in the 2004 PNR 
Agreement were fragmented at best; the “importance of respecting fundamental rights and freedoms, notably 
privacy” was superficially acknowledged.78 Vague references were made to the Data Protection Directive, 
the so-called Undertakings of the CBP from May 11, 2004, that accompanied the 2004 PNR Agreement and 
the above-mentioned Commission Decision that, for its part, relied on the Undertakings.79 Then, U.S. laws 
and constitutional requirements were made the major standard governing the processing of the data 
received.80 Finally, a joint and regular review by the BCBS and the Commission was provided for – but 
without any temporal or procedural framework.81 
The ignorance of the doubts and objections of the Parliament by the Commission and the Council 
hastened the Parliament to take action and make the next move. 
3. ECJ Proceedings 
As alluded to in its Resolution from March 31, 2004, the Parliament had initiated proceedings to the 
ECJ on April 21, 2004, and requested its opinion on the legality of the agreement or the corresponding acts 
by the Commission and the Council pursuant to Article 300 (6) of the then-valid EC Treaty. However, as it 
was ignored by the the Commission and the Council that had finally adopted the relevant acts without a 
statement of the Parliament, it decided to change course. On July 9, 2004, the Parliament withdrew its 
request to the ECJ and initiated contentious proceedings. These proceedings aimed at the annulment of the 
above mentioned acts by the Commission and the Council on procedural and subtantive grounds. The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (“EDPS”) was granted leave to intervene in the proceedings in support 
of the Parliament.82 
On November 22, 2005, Advocate General Léger released a thoroughly drafted opinion that covered a 
wide range of the issues raised by the Parliament.83 In his opinion, Léger argued that both the Commission 
and the Council Decision were illegal and, therefore, to be annulled by the Court.84 
In his view, the Commission Decision was to be rejected for lack of legal basis in the Data Protection 
Directive. The Directive, he stated, did not provide for measures concerning “public security, defence, 
State security . . . and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law”85 and hence, could not serve as a 
suitable legal basis for the Commission Decision at hand.86 Moreover, in his opinion, the Council 
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Decision lacked a suitable legal basis as well. The provision of Article 95 of the then-valid EC Treaty, he 
stated, did not provide for a legal foundation for measures focusing on public security and defense such as 
the Council Decision at hand.87 The most elaborate and—from a fundamental rights perspective—
insightful part of Léger’s opinion, however, constitutes the assessment of the pleas that allege an 
infringement of the right to protection of personal data and a breach of the principle of proportionality.88 
In this context, he unfolded a thorough analysis of the 2004 PNR Agreement in light of the right to respect 
for private life as enshrined in Article 8 ECHR and interpreted by the ECtHR as well as the ECJ (II.B.).89 
As a result of this analysis, Léger found: 
[W]hen all those safeguards are taken into account, the Council and the Commission cannot be 
considered to have exceeded the limits of the wide discretion which they must, in my view, be 
allowed for the purpose of combating terrorism and other serious crimes. It follows that the pleas 
alleging infringement of the right to protection of personal data and breach of the principle of 
proportionality are unfounded and must therefore be dismissed.90 
Beforehand, however, Léger had made a debatable argument in favor of a limited level of scrutiny in 
the case at hand which he consequently applied to his legal assesment.91 Nevertheless, even today, this 
part of Léger’s Opinion constitutes one of the most important official analyses in the context of PNR 
information sharing in particular and at the junction of counter-terrorism and human rights in general. 
For the very proceedings, however, this part of the Opinion turned out to be—at least formally—
ineffective. In its decision handed down on May 30, 2006, the ECJ struck down both the Commission 
Decision as well as the Council Decision—the first for lack of suitable legal basis, the second for wrong 
legal foundation—without further addressing questions of conformity with fundamental rights.92 At the 
same time and for reasons of legal certainty, it limited the temporary effects of the judgment so that the 
2004 PNR Agreement would preliminarily stay in force and the organs involved would have to 
terminate it according to the procedures laid down in the very Agreement.93 As a consequence, the 
Commission and the Council, in compliance with the judgement, terminated the Agreement a few weeks 
later, set back to the very beginning of its efforts in that matter.94 
4. Toward the 2007 PNR Agreement 
The victory of the Parliament, however, did not last long and turned out to be pyrrhic. Following the 
judicial defeat, in October 2006, an interim Agreement was adopted to secure the transatlantic cooperation in 
the PNR context until the end of July 2007.95 At the same time, negotiations for a new PNR Agreement were 
carried out and, in June 2007, the Council adopted a decision on the signing of the new Agreement.96 By doing 
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this, the Council responded to the ECJ judgment and chose Articles 24 and 38 of the then-valid EU Treaty as 
the corresponding legal foundation.97 These provisions were part of the system of rules that established the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters respectively98 
and allowed the Council to conclude agreements with third countries. According to this set of rules, however, 
neither the Parliament nor the ECJ had anysay in the procedure of the adoption of such agreements. 
5. The 2007 PNR Agreement 
The 2007 PNR Agreement consists of a preamble and nine paragraphs. Pursuant to the core provision, “the 
European Union will ensure that air carriers operating passenger flights in foreign air transportation to or from 
the United States of America will make available PNR data contained in their reservation systems as required by 
DHS.”99 The method to be applied is a “pull system” that allows U.S. authorities to access to the relevant data 
directly. Only after January 1, 2008, a “push system” was to be used with regard to those air carriers that dispose 
of the necessary technical requirements.100 The most striking aspect, however, is that the Agreement is not, like 
the 2004 Agreement, to be perceived in combination with a Decision of the Commission and Undertakings. It is 
rather accompanied by a mere letter by the Secretary of Homeland Security whose intent is “to explain how the 
United States Department of Homeland Security handles the collection, use, and storage of Passenger Name 
Records.”101 It does, by no means, “create or confer any right or benefit on any person or party, private or public, 
nor any remedy other than that specified in the Agreement between the EU and the U.S. on the processing and 
transfer of PNR by air carriers to DHS signed in July 2007 (the Agreement).”102 
Against this backdrop, there would surely be enough grounds for doubts and objections to be raised by the 
Parliament or, even for the initiation of new proceedings to the ECJ. For the above-mentioned reasons, however, 
the latter option in particular is not at the disposal of the Parliament this time. As the 2007 PNR Agreement, 
pursuant to its ninth paragraph, is to expire in a few years, the Parliament seemed to have given away its 
influence on the issue for quite some time. However, and most likely due to the recent changes on the legal, 
institutional and political planes (IV), it will be able to wield its influence on the issue much earlier (IV. B). 
IV. THE IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND OF THE NEW PNR AGREEMENT 
There is every reason to believe that the negotiators had the lessons—learned from the rich history of 
the transatlantic cooperation on PNR information management—in mind when they negotiated and agreed 
upon the new PNR Agreement (III). Apart from that, however, certain developments of the recent past are 
likely to have had a significant impact on or to have even framed the negotiations and, as a consequence, be 
reflected in the concrete design of the new PNR Agreement. 
Among those developments are the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (A) and the translation 
into practice of the corresponding legal changes by the Parliament (B) and the ECJ (C). Moreover, the 
Commission (D) as well as the German Federal Constitutional Court (E) may have contributed their 
share. Finally, there were significant changes in U.S. polictics (F). 
A. THE LISBON TREATY 
A first aspect of the changed situation in which the negotiations on a new PNR Agreement took place 
is the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009.103 Although it lacked the constitutional 
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pathos of the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Treaty came along with a complete 
overhaul of the European constitutional order. It brought about many changes to the European Treaties—
among those, institutional, substantive, and procedural changes. As to the PNR context, however, two major 
changes are of particular importance.104 
First, the distribution of power within the institutional structure of the EU has been modified and, in 
this context, the position of the Parliament has been significantly strenghtened. As a consequence, the 
influence of the Parliament has been reinforced in areas in which the Parliament had already had a say and it 
has been granted additional competencies in areas that it had been excluded from before.105 With respect to 
the new PNR Agreement, this means that the approval of the Parliament will be required.106 
Second, the importance of the protection of fundamental rights, in general, and of privacy and personal 
data, in particular, has been underpinned. An expression of this is, amongst others, the newly worded Article 
6(1) TEU that made the formerly non-binding ChFREU into binding primary law.107 Under the new legal 
framework, the protection of privacy can not only be brought to bear by means of Article 8 ECHR, but also 
by Article 7 ChFREU (right to respect for private life). Moreover, the protection of personal data can be 
specifically called for by invoking Article 8 ChFREU (right to protection of personal data) and Article 16(1) 
TFEU which repeats the guarantee laid down in Article 8 ChFREU. 
The shift reflected by these institutional and substantive changes was certainly not limited to the legal 
text in itself, but was rather put to practice by the Parliament (B) and the ECJ (C). 
B. THE REJECTION OF THE 2009 SWIFT AGREEMENT BY THE PARLIAMENT 
The Parliament in fact did not hesitate to make use of its new position and the increased power that came 
along with it. On February 11, 2010, it rejected the 2009 SWIFT Agreement between the U.S. and the EU.108 
The 2009 SWIFT Agreement, governed by the system of rules on the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters respectively, had been adopted by the Council on 
November 30, 2009 and without the consent of the Parliament. Only one day later, the Treaty of Lisbon would 
have entered into force and required the consent of the Parliament.109 Hence, the later rejection of the SWIFT 
Agreement can be read as a self-conscious signal toward the U.S. as well as the Commission and the Council. 
In the following re-negotiations towards the 2010 SWIFT Agreement, the concerns raised by the Parliament 
were taken more seriously. Further, the Parliament also had the opportunity to vote on it.110 
C. THE ECJ DECISION ON AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES 
Similar to the Parliament, the ECJ quickly turned out to be aware of the changes the Treaty of 
Lisbon brought by to the European Treaties. This holds especially true with regard to the increased 
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importance of the protection of fundamental rights.111 As far as the increased protection of personal data 
in particular is conerned, the ECJ already had a chance to forcefully bring its corresponding awareness 
to bear.112 
In the underlying case, the ECJ had to decide whether the publication of certain information about the 
beneficiaries of EU agricultural subsidies as provided for by EU secondary law was in conformity with EU 
primary law.113 The relevant provisions of secondary law had established that certain personal information 
(including the full name, the postal code, and the municipality of residence) and certain financial 
information (including the amount of payments received) were to be disclosed to the general public.114 In its 
judgment from November 19, 2010, the Court invoked the Charter as the relevant yardstick, declared the 
provisions as against Articles 7 and 8 ChFREU insofar as natural persons were concerned and 
correspondingly annulled them.115 The decision has provoked a lively political and academic debate on the 
proper balance of EU spending transparency and the protection of personal data.116 In any event, the ECJ 
decision confirms both the determination of the ECJ to translate the substantive changes of the Treaty of 
Lisbon into practice as well as to hold up fundamental rights protection in politically sensitive 
circumstances.117 
D. INTERNAL EU LEGISLATION 
The fourth consideration refers to actions taken by the EU legislature with regard to the implementation 
of a European PNR system. In the 2004 PNR Agreement, the EU insinuated the possibility of establishing its 
own system of collection, processing, use, storage, and transfer of PNR data: 
In the event that an airline passenger identification system is implemented in the European Union 
which requires air carriers to provide authorities with access to PNR data for persons whose 
current travel itinerary includes a flight to or from the European Union, DHS shall, in so far as 
practicable and strictly on the basis of reciprocity, actively promote the cooperation of airlines 
within its jurisdiction.”118 
The same provision can be found in the 2007 PNR Agreement.119 
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It should not have come as a surprise when the Commission, on November 6, 2007, released a 
“Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record for law enforcement 
purposes.”120 It provided for “the making available by air carriers of PNR data of passengers of international 
flights to the competent authorities of the Member States, for the purpose of preventing and combating 
terrorist offences and organised crime, as well as the collection and retention of those data by these 
authorities and the exchange of those data between them.”121 The core provision established: 
Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that air carriers make available the 
PNR data of the passengers of international flights to the national Passenger Information Unit of 
the Member State on whose territory the international flight referred to is entering, departing, or 
transiting, in accordance with the conditions specified in this Framework Decision.122 
Despite the safeguard mechanisms contained in the 2007 Proposal (especially Art. 11 and 12 of the 
2007 Proposal), it was confronted with fierce criticism by the Parliament.123 Moreover, many doubts and 
objections were raised by experts on fundamental rights and data protection such as the EDPS,124 the 
DPWP,125 and the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).126 The EDPS in particular 
forcefully lamented the “move towards a total surveillance society.”127 It highlighted the “major impact 
in terms of data protection of the present proposal” and stated that it is, under the present circumstances, 
“not in conformity with fundamental rights, notably Article 8 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights 
of the Union, and should not be adopted.”128 Finally, it made a wise suggestion of a political nature: 
“[t]he EDPS notes that the present proposal is made at a moment when the institutional context of 
the European Union is about to change fundamentally. The consequences of the Lisbon Treaty in 
terms of decision making will be fundamental, especially with regard to the role of the 
Parliament. Considering the unprecedented impact of the proposal in terms of fundamental rights, 
the EDPS advised not to adopt it under the present Treaty Framework, but to ensure it follows the 
co-decision procedure foreseen by the new Treaty. This would strengthen the legal grounds on 
which the decisive measures envisaged in the proposal would be taken.”129 
Indeed, the adoption of the 2007 Proposal was rendered impossible when the Treaty of Lisbon entered 
into force on November 1, 2009, and, amongst others, abolished the legal instrument of a Council 
Framework Decision. 
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Consequentially, on February 2, 2011, the Commission presented a “Proposal for a Directive on the use 
of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime.”130 The 2011 Proposal provides for “the transfer by air carriers of Passenger 
Name Record data of passengers of international flights to and from the Member States, as well as the 
processing of that data, including its collection, use, and retention by the Member States and its exchange 
between them.”131 Pursuant to the core provision, “Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to 
ensure that air carriers transfer ('push') the PNR data as defined in Article 2(c) and specified in the Annex, to 
the extent that such data are already collected by them, to the database of the national Passenger Information 
Unit of the Member State on the territory of which the international flight will land or from the territory of 
which the flight will depart.”132 Hence, it establishes, in principle, a system of information gathering, use, 
and exchange similar to the one envisaged by the 2007 Proposal. The 2011 Proposal claims, however, to 
take into account the critical opinions expressed on the 2007 Proposal by the Parliament as well as the 
experts on fundamental rights and data protection mentioned above.133 And indeed, several modifications 
can be found that reflect an increase of the level of data protection compared to the safeguards provided for 
by the 2007 Proposal. Nevertheless, the 2011 Proposal has equally been confronted with severe criticism by 
experts on fundamental rights and data protection.134 The so-called Meijers Committee, e.g., concluded with 
particular force: 
Considering the risks of violation of non-discrimination, privacy and data protection, and the 
freedom of movement of EU citizens and third-country nationals, together with the failure to 
address its necessity and added value (and the high costs for the individual Member States and air 
transport organisations), the Meijers Committee recommends the withdrawal of the proposed 
PNR Directive.135 
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As the 2011 Proposal is currently in the midst of the legislative procedure, little can be said about the 
final outcome. However, recent media reports insinuate that there will be an expansion of the scope of the 
2011 Proposal rather than a limitation.136 
E. BVERFG DECISIONS 
In addition to these developments on the EU level, relevant developments at the junction of the EU 
level and the Member State level have to be added to the picture. Among these are two decisions handed 
down by the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in 2009 and 2010.137 The background for the 
decisions is the constant struggle between the ECJ and the national Constitutional Courts of the Member 
States, first and foremost the BVerfG, about the final say in matters of European integration.138 
On June 30, 2009, the BVerfG handed down a decision on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(more precisely, of the German legislation aimed at its implementation).139 It established that some specific 
substantive areas constituted essential components of the “Constitutional identity” (Verfassungsidentität) 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and that these areas were not at the disposal of the EU.140 Not even one 
year later, on March 2, 2010, the BVerfG struck down major parts of the German legislation aimed at the 
implementation of the Data Retention Directive as unconstitutional.141 In this decision, the BVerfG established: 
[I]t is part of the Constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany that the citizen’s exercise 
of their freedoms is not totally being observed and registered . . . . By implementing a system of 
precautionary retention of telecommunication data, the possibility to implement other measures of 
precautionary collection of data is significantly reduced – also by way of the European Union.142 
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By saying this, the BVerfG sent a clear signal to Brussels, Strasburg, and Luxemburg on its 
determination to protect the German Constitutional identity against a potential intrusion by the 
Union.143 
F. MAJOR CHANGES IN U.S. POLITICS 
Whereas many of the developments on the European side can be traced back to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the most important developments on the U.S. side are related to the presidential 
election held in 2008 and, hence, of a genuinely political nature. 
On November 4, 2008, Illinois Senator Barack Obama was elected as the forty-fourth President of 
the United States. On January 20, 2009, he succeeded George W. Bush, who had controlled the fate of 
the country since January 2001. The cooperation between the U.S. and the EU in the area of 
counterterrorism in general and in the context of PNR information sharing in particular appears to have 
been relatively troublesome. As regards to the latter, the 2003 PNR Communication conveys an 
impression of how difficult the cooperation between the Bush Administration and the EU sometimes 
must have been: 
The Commission had asked the U.S. authorities concerned to suspend the enforcement of 
their requirements until a secure legal framework had been established for such transfers. In 
the light of the U.S. refusal, the option of insisting on the enforcement of law on the EU side 
would have been politically justified, but it would not have served the above objectives. It 
would have undermined the influence of more moderate and co-operative counsels in 
Washington and substituted a trial of strength for the genuine leverage we have as co-
operative partners.144 
Against this backdrop, there is every reason to believe that the arrival of the Obama Administration 
to the White House, in the eyes of the primary institutions of the EU, came along with the hope for and 
the expectation of a more accessible climate in future cooperation. Correspondingly, the European 
Council expressed that “[t]he arrival of a new U.S. administration is an opportunity for giving a fresh 
impetus to EU-U.S. relations which are more important than ever.”145 More specifically, it stated that it 
looked forward “to working with the US in the fight against terrorism, in full respect of human rights 
and international humanitarian law.”146 Although not less determined than the Bush Administration, the 
Obama Administration in fact seems to be more aware of the concerns of its allies. After all, the Obama 
Administration and the EU managed to negotiate and to adopt three important agreements in the area of 
interest here during the last two and a half years: the 2009 and 2010 SWIFT Agreements as well as the 
new PNR Agreement.147 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, THE NEW PNR AGREEMENT, AND A LOOK AHEAD 
The transatlantic cooperation in the PNR context is closely linked to the old dichotomy between 
security and privacy. Despite that—or simply because of it—it is a highly complex enterprise of a truely 
multidimensional nature. Just the legal dimension and its context help to prove the complexity of the issue: 
the two Commission Communications and the corresponding resolutions of the Parliament reflect the 
conflicting interests involved in the quest of the EU for a sound legal framework for the crossborder transfer 
of PNR data. Further, the two PNR Agreements between the U.S. and the EU (plus one interim Agreement), 
one of them struck down by the ECJ, display the great dynamics involved in the transatlantic dimension of 
the crossborder information sharing. Recent developments have brought further aspects into the already 
complex picture. Two things, however, have become clear as the transatlantic PNR saga has unfolded during 
the last ten years: i) the steady conviction of the U.S. Administration as well as the Commisison and the 
Council to maintain and extend the use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes; and ii) the persistent 
concerns of the Parliament and data protecion experts as to the adequacy of the level of data protection 
guaranteed by the relevant legal framework.148 
These patterns are also reflected in the new PNR Agreement that will be produced in the following 
weeks and months. The new PNR Agreement is said to represent “a big improvement over the existing 
Agreement from 2007.”149 Moreover, it is said to bring: “more clarity and legal certainty to both citizens 
and air carriers. It ensures better information sharing by U.S. authorities with law enforcement and 
judicial authorities from the EU, it sets clear limits on what purposes PNR data may be used for, and it 
contains a series of new and stronger data protection garantuees.”150 This refers, among others, to the 
limitation of the maximum retention period, the depersonalization of the data after a given period of 
time as well as the application of the “push” method as a general principle.151 
With that said it seems likely that the new PNR Agreement does indeed constitute a step forward 
in the areas of privacy and data protection. In the light of the history of transatlantic cooperation in 
PNR information sharing, it can be assumed, however, that it still contains provisions that have the 
potential to cause a fierce legal and political debate. Hence, the new PNR Agreement – as thoroughly 
as it may have been designed and as complete it may seem – will not be the end of the saga. It will just 
be the beginning of another intriguing chapter of a story that is already rich in controversy and 
infighting, but also in reconciliation both within the EU institutional structure as well as between the 
U.S. and the EU. 
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